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1. Introduction 
A large literature has examined the relation between firms and government in the 
United States, documenting the role of firms as contributors to politicians’ campaigns and 
as lobbyists in the political process (for reviews, see, e.g., Hillman, Keim, and Schuler, 
2004; Stratmann, 2005). The literature suggests that corporate political spending is highly 
profitable, earning margins above what would be expected in a competitive market and 
raising a “puzzle” of “astronomically high average rates of return on [political] 
investment” (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder, 2003, p. 111; also see, Tullock, 
1972). However, most of the returns cited as evidence for this puzzle are based on 
descriptive and univariate statistics – for example, by comparing the size of total 
government expenditures to aggregate campaign and lobbying spending by firms. The 
literature offers few, if any, rigorous estimates of returns to corporate political spending. 
There are two main reasons for this void. First, the benefits from legislation and 
regulation are usually indirect, long-term, and thus difficult to isolate. Second, it is 
difficult to identify that part of corporate political spending that represents an 
“investment” on which a return can be estimated. After all, there are other reasons for 
corporate political spending, including managerial consumption.  
In this paper, we exploit the setting of the 2004 passage of the American Jobs 
Creation Act (hereafter, AJCA or “the Act”) to overcome in part these empirical 
challenges to estimating a return on corporate political spending. The AJCA, among other 
provisions, offered U.S. firms a one-time tax break of up to 29.75% on accumulated 
foreign income repatriated and invested in U.S.-based capital projects. Such repatriation 
was required to be completed by the year following the Act’s passage, making it unlikely 2 
 
that firms adjusted real activities to take advantage of the Act. Moreover, repatriating 
firms had to disclose in their audited financial statements the precise amount repatriated 
under its provisions. These two features of the Act enable us to determine the benefits to 
firms from the repatriation-tax holiday in the Act, thus addressing the first of two key 
challenges to estimating returns to political spending.  
To overcome the second challenge to determining political returns, i.e., estimating 
the investment firms made to effect the repatriation-tax holiday’s passage through 
Congress, we need a method to parse this investment from a firm’s total political 
spending. To this end, we exploit the fact that prior published research has already 
investigated the incentives of firms repatriating under the Act. Specifically, Blouin and 
Krull (2009) provide an economic model of the determinants of firms’ repatriation under 
the Act. We expect that these economic forces that drive repatriation under the Act (e.g., 
a high effective U.S.-tax rate) also determine firms’ political spending to secure the 
repatriation-tax holiday’s passage. Accordingly, we estimate through a regression the 
component of a firm’s total political spending that is driven by these economic 
determinants, a value that we refer to as the firm’s “predicted political spending.” We 
then run a second regression where a firm’s repatriation under the Act is the dependent 
variable and “predicted political spending” is the explanatory variable of interest. The 
coefficient on “predicted political spending” in this second regression provides a 
marginal estimate of benefits to firms from incremental political spending to secure the 
passage of the Act’s repatriation-tax holiday.  
It is plausible, of course, that Blouin and Krull’s economic model of firms’ 
repatriation, like any empirical model of this nature, does not include all relevant 3 
 
explanatory variables. In this case, the second regression above suffers from an omitted-
variable bias, where the dependent variable (repatriations) and “predicted political 
spending” are jointly affected by omitted variables. To address this issue, we employ an 
instrumental-variable approach. That is, we use as an instrument in the first regression a 
variable that predicts firms’ political spending on the repatriation-tax holiday in the Act 
but that does not directly predict repatriations. Our instrument is the degree of political 
conservatism of the congressperson historically receiving the most contributions from a 
given firm. The historical level of PAC contributions between firm and congressperson 
can proxy for the relationship between the two (Snyder, 1992), so the congressperson 
with the most PAC receipts can be inferred to have a strong relationship with the firm. 
That congressperson’s ideology – measured over a conservative-liberal spectrum – can 
instrument for the firm’s tax-related political spending. The premise here is that the more 
conservative a firm’s congressional ally, the less tax-related political spending necessary 
by the firm because conservative politicians are ideologically more predisposed to 
support legislation on lower taxes.  
Importantly, the historically allied congresspersons’ ideology is not expected to 
directly predict repatriations because the firm-politician ties are expected to predate 
lobbying on the repatriation-tax holiday. This argument is supported by the legislative 
history of the repatriation-tax holiday in the AJCA. The Act was precipitated in part by 
European Union (EU) sanctions imposed in 2004 against certain U.S. export subsidies 
that the World Trade Organization (WTO) had ruled illegal. As Congress began the 
process to repeal the subsidies (and thus obviate the EU sanctions), questions were raised 
about how to redeploy the approximately $50 billion in savings that the U.S. Treasury 4 
 
would save as a result. It was in this climate that firms and their lobbyists actively pitched 
ideas for various corporate tax breaks, including a repatriation-tax holiday. Notably, prior 
to the EU sanctions and the public savings generated by repealing associated U.S. export 
subsidies, there was little political scope in Congress for corporate tax relief, in part due 
to large prevailing public deficits driven by war-time spending. In mid-2004, as the 
passage of some form of corporate tax relief became more likely, firms with accumulated 
overseas income lobbied for a repatriation-tax holiday. It is the return on political 
investment of these firms that we estimate in our study.  
The estimates from our regression model suggest that for the median U.S. firm 
with long-term political relationships at the time of the Act’s passage, an additional 
investment of $1 million in lobbying expenditures is associated with $32.35 million in 
taxes saved on repatriated foreign income. These estimates appear to be high relative to 
returns earned in competitive markets and are, in fact, consistent with there being a 
“puzzle” in returns to political investment. But, these estimates are considerably lower 
than those generated through descriptive methods. For example, Alexander, Scholz, and 
Mazza (2009), the only other study of which we are aware that attempts to measure 
returns to political spending on the AJCA, conclude that firms lobbying for the 
repatriation-tax holiday in the Act “have a return in excess of $220 for every $1 spent on 
lobbying.” Their estimate, which has been widely referenced in the press (e.g., Eggen, 
2009; Newman, 2011) and some academic work (e.g., Lessig, 2011), is essentially based 
on a univariate analysis – by aggregating the estimated tax savings of all firms 
repatriating under the Act and dividing by the lobbying expenditures of those firms. 
Thus, we argue that our study represents an improvement on the measurement of political 5 
 
returns to the repatriation-tax holiday in the AJCA and, in doing so, offers some insight 
into the margin of error embedded in estimates of returns to political spending obtained 
via descriptive methods. 
To conduct our study, we first identify the initiation of legislative action that 
eventually directly led to the passage of the AJCA. The first such legislative action was 
during the 108
th Congress (2003–2004). We next identify the sample of politically active 
U.S. firms with a history of at least five years leading up to 2003 – such firms are more 
likely to have the long-term relationships in Congress necessary to effect passage of the 
Act (e.g., Snyder, 1992). Then, we select only those firms operating overseas, since only 
such firms would be directly affected by a repatriation-tax holiday. Finally, we calculate 
the increase in political spending among these firms during the tenure of the 108
th 
Congress, which passed the Act (the increase is calculated over spending during the 107
th 
Congress, 2001–2002). We focus on changes in political spending because levels of 
spending, much like corporate dividends, can be sticky. 
We measure corporate political spending on the repatriation-tax holiday in the Act 
in three ways. First, we look at increases in contributions from firms’ political action 
committees (PAC) to members of Congress – these are usually direct contributions to the 
members’ individual campaign funds. Second, we look at increases in firms’ lobbying 
expenditures, which include corporate political spending on conferences, dinners, and 
other “informational events” where corporations advance their agenda with politicians 
and their staff. Finally, to isolate corporate political spending specifically related to taxes, 
we look at increases in lobbying disclosure reports of the same – that is, increases in the 
number of tax-related lobbying reports connected to a given firm. These three measures 6 
 
capture different aspects of corporate political investment and are often used concurrently 
by firms.  
As already noted, we find that for the median firm in our sample an increase of $1 
million in lobbying contributions (over the firm’s prior cycle contributions) is associated 
with $32.35 million in taxes saved on repatriated foreign income. Relatedly, we find that 
an increase of $100,000 in PAC contributions is associated with about $15.64 million in 
taxes saved and that the additional filing of ten tax-related lobbying reports is associated 
with about $21.08 million in taxes saved. The differences in return estimates across the 
three measures of corporate political spending can be at least partly attributed to the fact 
that each measure captures a somewhat different aspect of such spending.
1 But, as prior 
political science research has shown, firms generally use these various methods of 
political spending in complement with each other (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Tripathi, 
2002). Thus, it is likely more meaningful to consider the three return estimates jointly. 
Our results should also be interpreted in the context of the following observation. 
We focus on political investments for a repatriation-tax holiday during a single 
congressional cycle, 2003–2004. We do not consider political investments on this issue 
that firms may have made in prior cycles. To the extent that these prior investments also 
contributed to the repatriation-tax holiday’s passage in 2004, our return estimates are 
biased upward. The legislative history of the repatriation-tax holiday in the AJCA (briefly 
summarized earlier and discussed in greater detail in Section 2) mitigates this concern to 
some extent. Moreover, our empirical strategy, which is focused primarily on changes in 
political spending in the 2003–2004 cycle, is intended to further forestall this concern. As 
                                                 
1 Further, the size of PAC contributions, unlike lobbying spending, was limited by law during at that time. 7 
 
such, our regressions estimate the marginal benefit of an incremental dollar of political 
spending in the 2003–2004 period, above that routinely spent to maintain ties with 
politicians. In this sense, our method for estimating political returns is designed to 
generate upper-bound estimates of the “true” return value. 
In addition to contributing to the literature on returns to corporate political 
spending by providing more careful estimates of the returns, our study adds to the 
literature on corporate taxation. Our results are particularly relevant in light of continued 
corporate attempts to generate support in the Congress for another “one-time” tax break 
on repatriated foreign income in line with the AJCA of 2004 (e.g., Worstall, 2013; 
Stephenson and Temple-West, 2014). As of 2013 U.S. companies are estimated to have 
stockpiled nearly $1 trillion in cash overseas (e.g., Waters, 2014), and such stockpiling is 
sometimes attributed by the press to the companies’ desire to avoid taxation in the United 
States (e.g., O’Brien, 2014). As companies have ramped up their political spending for 
another tax holiday on repatriations, our study provides some perspective on how this 
renewed corporate political investment could pay off. Specifically, our study suggests 
that the very high returns to political investment heralded in the press – obtained through 
descriptive methods – are, in fact, nearly an order of magnitude smaller when more 
rigorously estimated via instrumentation.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some 
background to the passage of the 2004 American Jobs Creation Act and describes 
relevant research. Section 3 details our research design, including our choice of 
instrument. Section 4 describes the results. Section 5 concludes. 8 
 
2. Background and related research 
The AJCA of 2004 has its origins in a WTO ruling that a certain U.S. subsidy for 
exports by U.S.-based companies was illegal. The subsidy was known as the extra-
territorial income (ETI) exclusion. The WTO ruling invited tariffs by the EU against 
imports from the U.S. subject to the ETI exclusion. Starting in March 2004, the EU began 
imposing a five percent tariff on associated U.S. imports, with a planned one percent 
increase per month, as a way to force the U.S. to repeal the ETI exclusion. As U.S. 
exporters began to feel the costs of the EU tariffs, pressure began to build in Congress to 
repeal the ETI exclusion. A related discussion among lobbyists and congresspersons was 
what to do with the approximately $50 billion the U.S. Treasury was expected to net from 
the ETI-exclusion repeal. A number of interested firms (and their lobbyists) began 
arguing for a holiday on taxes owed on accumulated overseas income.  
The United States is among a handful of countries that taxes its citizens and 
corporations on worldwide income. However, in general, corporations can delay paying 
taxes on foreign income until such income is repatriated to the United States. This 
situation has from time-to-time resulted in large build-ups of accumulated overseas 
income by U.S. corporations. One such time period was the early 2000s. The weak 
economy and high unemployment of the period raised the visibility of U.S. corporations’ 
accumulated overseas income. But prior to the WTO’s ruling and associated EU 
sanctions (during the 2003–2004 congressional cycle), the likelihood of congressional 
passage of a tax break for corporations – such as a tax holiday for repatriated corporate 
income – was relatively low. Growing public deficits driven by U.S. military action in the 
Middle East made further charges to the exchequer politically difficult. However, the 9 
 
sudden emergence of $50 billion in savings to the U.S. Treasury from the ETI-exclusion 
repeal raised the possibility that these savings could be applied to fund corporate tax 
relief of some form.  
The increasing trend of corporate outsourcing to offshore destinations created 
additional impetus for tax-policy changes that would encourage U.S.-based corporate 
investment. The looming general election of 2004 provided a sense of urgency as 
politicians spoke of an act to “make our manufacturing, service, and high-technology 
businesses and workers more competitive and productive both at home and abroad” (U.S. 
House, 2004). While the adoption of broad-based corporate tax relief was considered 
difficult during the 2001–2002 congressional cycle, by the summer of 2004 Congress was 
ready to pass such legislation.  
It was not obvious that congressional legislation for corporate tax relief in 2004 
would include a tax holiday on repatriated income. Export-oriented American firms that 
did not have substantial overseas operations (and thus, did not have significant 
accumulated overseas income) had their own proposals for how the savings to the 
exchequer from the ETI exclusion repeal should be deployed. These firms lobbied for 
domestic manufacturing tax subsidies instead.  
The inclusion of a repatriation-tax holiday in the AJCA of 2004 was a process 
involving the participation of many corporate interest groups.
2 For example, more than 
fifty multinational companies (including Apple, Altria, Eli Lily, Hewlett Packard, and 
Intel) formed a coalition called the Homeland Investment Act Coalition (HIAC) to lobby 
for the repatriation-tax holiday. The HIAC’s position was supported by another group 
                                                 
2 See Alexander et al. (2009) for a review of the events surrounding the passage of the Act.  10 
 
called the Coalition for Fair International Taxation, which represented over thirty 
multinational firms such as Bank of America, GE, and Wal-Mart. Later, in Section 3, we 
attempt to systematically construct the sample of firms that were likely lobbying for the 
repatriation-tax holiday in 2004. It is on this sample that we measure returns to political 
investment.  
Eventually, firms lobbying for a repatriation-tax holiday were successful in 
securing its inclusion in the AJCA. That Act also included a tax deduction for income 
from U.S. production activities, suggesting that the export-oriented domestic 
manufacturers without accumulated overseas income were also successful in their 
lobbying efforts.
3 
The repatriation-tax holiday in the Act has been controversial. This controversy 
stems from a provision in the Act that repatriated income be deployed toward domestic 
investment and job creation rather than equity and management-compensation payouts. 
Supporters of the repatriation-tax holiday argue that it brought overseas money back to 
the U.S. and helped create jobs, while its opponents claim corporations used the 
“repatriated money to buy up their own stock rather than to expand or create jobs” 
(McKinnon, 2009). Blouin and Krull (2009) find evidence that firms that repatriated 
under the Act had lower investment opportunities and higher free cash flows than non-
repatriating firms. Further, repatriating firms increased their share repurchases by nearly 
$60 billion more than a matched-sample of non-repatriating counterparts. Their results 
                                                 
3 Estimating the return on political spending for this group of firms seeking domestic manufacturing tax 
subsidies is more difficult for a number of reasons. First, the benefits from these subsidies are likely to be 
accrued over many years. Second, these firms’ future manufacturing activities are likely to be affected by 
the subsidies, making the benefits endogenous to the Act’s passage. 11 
 
are corroborated by the findings of a survey conducted on corporate tax executives 
(Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin, 2010). Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011) also find 
similar results: they show for every one-dollar increase in firms’ repatriation, there is a 
$0.60 to $0.92 increase in their payout to shareholders. Relatedly, Faulkender and 
Peterson (2012) find no increases in domestic investment for repatriating firms without 
capital constraints, although they also find “little change” in such firms’ equity payouts. 
Oler, Shevlin, and Wilson (2007) find shareholders anticipated the tax savings related to 
the Act: repatriating firms’ stock prices reflected the potential savings even prior to the 
passage of the Act. 
Different from the studies above, this paper does not draw conclusions on the 
effectiveness of the repatriation-tax holiday. Rather, the primary purpose of this paper is 
to offer more robust estimates of the returns to political spending. Ansolabehere at al. 
(2003, p. 111) summarize findings of “astronomically high rates of return” to political 
investments, but much of the evidence marshaled on this point is descriptive in nature. 
Beyond the descriptive evidence, there are some event studies of firms’ stock-market 
returns to certain exogenous political incidents – e.g., the death of a senator (Roberts, 
1990) or the unexpected cross-party defection of a senator (Jayachandran, 2006). These 
events studies offer some insight into the sensitivity of firm value to the political 
incidents in question. But inferring returns to firms’ prior political investment from such 
event studies is at best indirect. In addition to the event studies, there are a handful of 
association studies documenting long-run correlations between corporate political 
spending and future firm performance (e.g., Cooper, Gulen, Ovtchinnikov, 2010). But 
such association studies often lack compelling identification strategies, so the 12 
 
documented correlations cannot be attributed to an investment-return relation.
4 Moreover, 
there is no conceptual basis to determine the horizon over which returns to political 
spending should be measured in these studies, so decisions to this effect are arbitrary, and 
the return estimates generated are ad hoc.  
Prior literature has encountered two main challenges in estimating returns to 
political investment: quantifying the precise benefits from a given legislation or 
regulation; and determining the precise investment in political spending to attain that 
specific benefit.  Using the AJCA setting allows us to quantify the benefit because firms 
are required to disclose in audited reports the precise amount repatriated. We also use a 
novel instrument to isolate the increase in political spending, i.e., the political investment, 
specifically attributable to the repatriation-tax holiday in the AJCA. As such, our setting 
and research methodology allow us to more rigorously estimate an upper bound for the 
returns to political spending. 
The only other study to estimate the return on political spending to the 
repatriation-tax holiday in the AJCA is Alexander et al. (2009). That study simply 
aggregates the estimated tax savings of all firms repatriating under the Act and divides by 
the lobbying expenditures of these firms (see, in particular, Section III B and Table 6 of 
Alexander et al.). The return estimate in Alexander et al. does not address the central 
challenges in estimating the returns to political spending.  
Our effort at estimating returns to political spending on the repatriation-tax 
holiday in the AJCA is also relevant given renewed interest in a tax provision similar to 
                                                 
4 There are other reasons (besides an investment-return relation) to expect positive long-run correlations 
between corporate political spending and future firm performance – e.g., managers of well-performing 
firms could engage in political spending as a form of personal consumption.  13 
 
the 2004 Act. In 2011, several influential companies, including Apple, Cisco, Google, 
and Microsoft, formed a lobbying coalition to push for another tax break on repatriated 
earnings (e.g., Eggen, 2011; Rubin, 2012). These companies spent $760,000 on the 
initiative before ceasing their efforts in March 2012 after realizing there was little 
political will behind the issue that year (e.g., Rubin, 2012). But starting 2013, there has 
been further debate for another bill like the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. In 2013, 
Apple’s CEO, Tim Cook, testified to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations and called on Congress to reduce taxes on repatriated earnings to the single 
digits (e.g., Hook and Yadron, 2013). At that time Cook revealed that Apple had $100 
billion in offshore earnings that he was not willing to bring back to the U.S. under the 
current tax rate. In 2014, several influential U.S. senators expressed support for 
eliminating or reducing the U.S. tax rate on repatriated income. These senators included 
Ron Wyden (chair of the Senate Finance Committee), Harry Reid (Democratic Majority 
Leader), and Rand Paul (potential Republican presidential nominee in 2016) (e.g., 
Murphy, 2014; Pozen, 2014).  
The results of this paper can add to the literature on the American Jobs Creation 
Act of 2004 and to the broader literature on business engagement in the political process 
by providing a more careful estimate of returns to political spending on tax issues. This 
contribution is relevant to both academia (given the limited empirical evidence on the 
subject) and public policy (given the current interest in another tax break on 
repatriations).  14 
 
3. Research design 
In this section, we detail our research design for generating estimates of the return 
to political spending on the repatriation-tax holiday in the AJCA. For such estimates, we 
need to establish a statistical link between repatriation under the Act and political 
spending for the reduced tax on repatriations. To do so, we begin by identifying the 
sample of politically active firms in the United States that were in existence during the 
period in which firms could repatriate under the Act. We define a firm as “politically 
active” if it has at least one active PAC in the period of interest. By this definition, there 
are 1,400 politically active firms on COMPUSTAT in the year 2006, which is the last 
possible year for firms to repatriate under the Act. Next, we restrict this group of firms to 
those that could avail of their political relationships to effect the Act’s passage. The first 
congressional event related to the Act’s passage was during the 108
th Congress (2003–
2004), so ordinarily we would restrict the sample of 1,400 politically active firms to those 
around from 2003. But, prior research in political science has shown that usually firms 
must be involved with politicians over an extended period of time for the firms to reap 
benefits from that relationship (e.g., Snyder, 1992). Accordingly, we limit our sample to 
firms with at least five years of history at the time of the initiation of the 108
th Congress. 
That is, our sample consists of politically active U.S. firms operating at least since 1998 
and at least through 2006. There are 880 such firms in COMPUSTAT. Finally, we restrict 
this group to only firms operating overseas, since only such firms would be directly 
affected by the repatriation-tax holiday in the Act. This restriction yields a sample of 513 
firms. Subsequent data requirements necessitated by our multivariate regressions, 
described shortly, reduce this sample to 511 firms. 15 
 
In this sample, we measure changes in corporate political spending during the 
tenure of the 108
th Congress, which passed the AJCA. The changes are calculated relative 
to political spending during the preceding 107
th Congress (2001–2002). We measure 
corporate political spending in three ways. First, we look at changes in sample firms’ 
PAC contributions. Here, PAC contributions refer to aggregate donations made by the 
political action committee(s) associated with a specific sample firm to members of 
Congress. The PAC data are obtained from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), 
which compiles the information from the Federal Election Commission (FEC). All PACs 
must file quarterly or monthly reports disclosing their receipts and disbursements with the 
FEC.
5 Prior political science research using changes in political spending note the highly 
skewed (non-normal) distribution of these data (e.g., Ansolabehere et al., 2002). Such 
studies usually employ a cube-root transformation of the changes data (rather than the log 
transformation more common in finance research) – the cube-root transformation 
normalizes the distribution without causing a problem for cases of zero changes in 
political spending (which are common). Thus, our proxy for changes in sample firms’ 
PAC contributions is the cube root of the difference between the values for the 108
th and 
107
th Congresses.  
Our second measure of corporate political spending is firms’ lobbying 
expenditures. These expenditures are distinct from PAC contributions, which are focused 
on election campaigns. Lobbying expenditures represent firms’ spending on registered 
lobbyists (including retired politicians) and related activities, including conferences and 
other events where corporations can advance their agenda with politicians and their staff. 
                                                 
5 The CRP’s data are available at www.opensecrets.org. 16 
 
As with PAC contributions, when measuring the change in lobbying expenditures from 
the 107
th to the 108
th Congress, we use the cube root of the difference as our final proxy. 
We obtain firms’ lobbying expenditures from the CRP, which compiles the data from 
reports filed with the Senate Office of Public Records. Since the passage of Lobbying 
Disclosure Act of 1995, organizations involved in lobbying activities at the federal level 
are required to file semi-annually with the Senate information on their lobbying-related 
expenditures.  
Changes in PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures can be associated with 
political causes not related to taxes. Our third measure of corporate political spending 
intends to capture the intensity of lobbying specifically associated with tax issues. 
Specifically, we measure for our sample firms the change in the number of lobbying 
reports identifying taxes as a lobbied issue. Every organization (registered lobbyist) that 
receives money from a firm to lobby on its behalf must file a report with the Senate under 
the Lobbying Disclosure Act. The reports, which are standardized, contain information 
on the lobbyist’s client account, including the client’s name, the aggregate lobbying 
amount, and the issues lobbied on. We use the data in these reports to determine for each 
sample firm the number of lobbying reports that identify tax as a lobbied issue. For 
example, Appendix A provides the report William and Jensen, PC, filed for its $260,000 
lobbying efforts on behalf of Dell for the second half of 2004. The report provides 
information on the general issues on which William and Jensen lobbied on behalf of Dell 
– federal appropriations, homeland security, Navy Marine Corps Intranet programs, cyber 
security, and tax issues. For 2004, there are five reports like the one in Appendix A filed 
with respect to Dell that disclose lobbying focused on tax. We use the annual number of 17 
 
reports that disclose tax as a lobbying issue as our proxy for the intensity of lobbying 
specifically associated with tax issues.  
We conduct this procedure for both the 107
th and 108
th Congresses to determine 
the change in the number of tax-related lobbying reports for sample firms. As with PAC 
contributions and lobbying expenditures, when measuring changes in the number of tax-
related lobbying reports, we use the cube root of the difference between the values for the 
108
th and 107
th Congresses as our final proxy.  
The advantage to this third measure of corporate political spending is that it 
focuses specifically on taxes. Of course, increases in tax-related lobbying reports during 
the 108
th Congress could be for reasons unrelated to the repatriation holiday that was 
eventually codified in the AJCA. To investigate this concern, we examine every tax law 
that was passed by the 108
th Congress as well as every tax bill that made it at least to 
House floor action to identify any potential concurrent tax events.
6 
We obtain the tax law and tax bill information from the congressional Online 
library at www.thomas.loc.gov. There are forty-one tax bills that made it at least to House 
floor action during the 108
th Congress. Of these, twenty bills were passed by the Senate 
and sixteen were signed by the president into law. Panel A of Appendix B presents the 
breakdown of tax bills by the last stage achieved in the legislative process. Panel B of 
Appendix B presents the breakdown of the same forty-one bills by major issue. The data 
reveal that the majority of the tax bills were concerned with personal-level taxes. Several 
of the remaining tax bills potentially affected corporate taxes, but these bills largely 
focused on specific industries, such as transportation or healthcare. The only bill during 
                                                 
6 We limit bills to House floor action because constitutionally the House must introduce legislation on tax-
related issues before the Senate considers it. 18 
 
the 108
th Congress that broadly concerns corporate income tax is the American Jobs 
Creation Act. 
3.1. Regression design and instrumentation  
Estimating the return on political investments over the repatriation-tax holiday in 
the AJCA for our sample firms involves identifying that component of repatriations under 
the Act that can be attributed to increased political spending on a lower repatriation tax. 
One method to do so is to simply regress repatriations under the Act on increased 
political spending, controlling for the economic determinants of repatriation. The 
problem with this approach is that there can be numerous reasons for increased political 
spending that are unrelated to repatriation-tax lobbying. To address this problem, we 
attempt to identify in a preceding regression (“the first stage”) that component of 
increased political spending that can be attributed to promoting a repatriation-tax holiday. 
We use the model for the economic determinants of repatriation provided by Blouin and 
Krull (2009) in this first-stage regression – the assumption being that the same variables 
that predict repatriation under the Act also predict lobbying for the repatriation-tax 
holiday in the Act. We call the component of increased political spending attributed to 
the repatriation-tax holiday in the first-stage regression the “predicted political spending” 
(or  ). Then, in a primary regression (“the second stage”), where 
repatriation under the Act is the dependent variable, we estimate the coefficient on 
“predicted political spending.”  
The Blouin and Krull model (like any empirical model of this nature) can be 
incomplete, resulting in an omitted-variable bias in the second-stage regression. Put 
differently, if the model of economic determinants of repatriation under the Act (and 19 
 
lobbying for the repatriation-tax holiday) is incomplete, both the dependent variable and 
“predicted political spending” in the second-stage regression are influenced by omitted 
correlated variables. Estimates from such a regression will be biased. To address this 
issue, we instrument for political spending in the first-stage regression using a variable 
we call AllyIdeology.  
For a given firm, AllyIdeology is the value of congressional ideology for the 
congressperson receiving the most contributions from that firm in the 2001–2002 
congressional cycle (i.e., the prior cycle to the 108
th Congress). Here, “congressional 
ideology” is the first dimension of the widely used Common Space Score developed by 
Keith Poole and collaborators and available on Poole’s website, www.voteview.com 
(e.g., Poole, 1998). The level of PAC contributions between firm and congressperson 
during the preceding 107
th Congress can proxy for the relationship between the two, so 
the congressperson with the highest PAC contributions can be inferred to have a strong 
relationship with the firm. AllyIdeology measures how receptive a firm’s (historically 
most contributed to) congressional ally is to a reduced tax on repatriations. Ceteris 
paribus, the more conservative the congressional ally, the less the firm will have to spend 
on lobbying for lower taxes (since conservatives are more likely to favor lower taxes). 
AllyIdeology can make a good instrument in our setting because it is likely to predict 
political spending on taxes but is unlikely to be jointly determined with repatriations 
under the Act. This is because the relationship with the congressperson in question is 
expected to precede lobbying for the repatriation-tax holiday under the Act. Recall from 
Section 2 that it was only during the 2003–2004 congressional cycle – after the EU 
imposed sanctions on certain U.S. exporters and Congress considered repealing certain 20 
 
export subsidies – that passage of a broad-based corporate tax break, including a 
repatriation-tax holiday, became realistic.
7  
The predicted value of political spending from the first-stage regression using 
AllyIdeology as the instrument is used in the second-stage regression of repatriations 
under the Act. In other words, we estimate the following two regressions in our sample of 
firms. 
Political Spending = η0 + η 1*AllyIdeology + η {…}*{Controls} + ε1     … (1) 
Repatriation = λ0 + λ 1*  + λ {…}*{Controls} + ε2     … (2)  
In the above system of equations, Political Spending refers to one of the three 
proxies described earlier: (i) the cube-root transformation of the change in PAC 
contributions (hereafter, Δ PAC); (ii) the cube-root transformation of the change in 
lobbying expenditures (hereafter, Δ Lobbying); and (iii) the cube-root transformation of 
the change in the number of tax-related lobbying reports (hereafter, Δ Tax Reports).  
Repatriation in equation (2) is the dollar amount of repatriation under the Act, 
scaled by firm assets. Data on firms’ repatriation decisions, including the amount 
repatriated, are manually collected from 10-K filings in which such disclosures are 
required. We search sample firms’ 10-K filings during the years immediately following 
the Act’s passage for repatriation information. Since Repatriation is left censored at zero, 
we use a Tobit model in equation (2). Equation (1) is estimated using ordinary least 
squares. 
                                                 
7 Related to this argument, we use contributions during the 107
th Congress (rather than the 108
th) to 
compute AllyIdeology because firms could have ramped up contributions during the 108
th Congress to 
certain congresspersons with particular sway over the AJCA’s passage (e.g., House or Senate leaders). If 
so, such a congressperson’s ideology is not sufficiently exogenous for our purposes.  21 
 
The set {Controls} in the above equations constitutes the factors identified by 
Blouin and Krull (2009) as the economic determinants of repatriation. The Blouin and 
Krull study “investigates the characteristics of firms that repatriate under the Act,” so 
their model of the determinants of repatriations is well suited to our purposes. 
Specifically, Blouin and Krull (2009) argue firms that repatriate are more likely to have 
declining investment opportunities and a higher level of free cash flows in the years prior 
to the passage of the Act. Thus, the set {Controls} includes variables to this effect. The 
full list of controls and their definitions are given below.  
ΔROA  the change in net income scaled by worldwide assets for the period 
2001 to 2004 
ΔMB  the change in the firm’s market value to book value ratio for the 
period 2001 to 2004 
ΔRD  the change in the ratio of research and development expenses to 
worldwide assets for the period 2001 to 2004 
ΔCapEx  the change in capital expenditures divided by worldwide assets for 
the period 2001 to 2004 
FCF  the average operating cash flows divided by worldwide assets for 
the period 2001 to 2004 
USTR  the average U.S. tax rate from 2001 through 2004 
ΔFPTI  the change in foreign pre-tax income scaled by worldwide assets 
RateDum  a dummy variable set to one if the U.S. tax rate of 35% exceeds the 
average foreign tax rate from 2001 to 2004, zero otherwise 22 
 
%FAssets  the ratio of foreign assets (estimated as described in Oler et al., 
2007) to worldwide assets 
Among the variables above, ΔROA and change in foreign pre-tax income (ΔFPTI) 
are included to control for financial performance, ΔMB to control for growth 
opportunities, ΔRD to control for change in research and development, and ΔCapEx to 
control for change in capital expenditures. All these variables capture elements of firms’ 
declining investment opportunities. FCF is included to control for the level of free cash 
flows. Blouin and Krull also conjecture that firms with a high U.S. domestic tax burden, 
proxied by USTR and RateDum, are more likely to receive benefits by repatriating under 
the Act. All of the data necessary to construct these variables are obtained from 
COMPUSTAT. 
The value of the coefficient   in equation (2) is our estimate of the component 
of repatriations under the Act that can be attributed to political spending on a reduced tax 
on repatriations.  
4. Results 
4.1. Univariate analyses 
Before presenting the results of the regressions described in the previous section, 
here we lay out some descriptive statistics on our sample firms. Table 1 presents 
summary statistics for changes and levels in political spending for our sample firms. For 
comparison, this table includes a separate sample of the 367 politically active U.S. firms 
during our period of interest (that is, at least since 1998 and at least through 2006) that 
did not operate overseas. (Collectively, these 367 firms and our sample of 513 firms 23 
 
make up the 880 firms described at the beginning of Section 3.) For our 513 sample firms 
(with overseas operations), the mean values of changes in political spending across our 
three proxies are as follows: $21,401 for PAC contributions; $292,753 for lobbying 
expenditures; and 0.66 for tax-related lobbying reports. (To facilitate interpretation, the 
reported values in Table 1 have not been subject to cube-root transformation). The 
corresponding values for the 367 firms without overseas operations are $13,993 for PAC 
contributions, $72,899 for lobbying expenditures, and 0.15 for tax-related lobbying 
reports. The differences in means for lobbying expenditures and tax-related lobbying 
reports – but not PAC contributions – are statistically significant. 
The mean levels of political spending (during the 108
th Congress) for the 513 
sample firms are $118,569 for PAC contributions, $1,360,077 for lobbying expenditures, 
and 2.97 for tax-related lobbying reports. The corresponding mean levels of political 
spending for the 367 firms without overseas operations are $62,592 for PAC 
contributions, $323,171 for lobbying expenditures, and 1.05 for tax-related lobbying 
reports. The differences in mean levels across all three proxies are statistically significant. 
Table 1 also presents the median values of all of the variables discussed above. With the 
exception of levels and changes in PAC contributions, the median values are zero. This 
right skew in the distribution of the data is common to other studies using political 
spending proxies. Overall, the data from Table 1 suggest that our sample firms (those 
with overseas operations) exhibit higher levels and changes in political spending relative 
to politically active domestic firms.  
Table 2 presents the correlations between the various proxies for political 
spending. The correlations for both levels and changes in those proxies are reported. The 24 
 
correlations are calculated in our sample of 513 firms. The three different proxies for 
firms’ political spending show significantly positive correlation with each other in both 
levels and changes. This is consistent with prior evidence in the political science 
literature suggesting that PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures are often used in 
complement with each other as part of a firm’s integrated political-engagement strategy 
(e.g., Ansolabehere et al., 2002).  
Table 3 presents summary statistics for Repatriation and the various control 
variables used in the system of equations described in the prior section. The summary 
statistics are computed across our sample of 513 firms, subject to data availability (we 
lack the data required to calculate control variables for two of the firms). The mean value 
of Repatriation is 0.021, which suggests that the average firm repatriates about 2.1% of 
its assets under the Act. The median value of Repatriation is zero. Of particular interest, 
the mean and median values of AllyIdeology are 0.150 and 0.236, respectively. The first 
dimension of Common Space Scores, which AllyIdeology represents, is scaled between 
+1 and –1, where positive values suggest political conservatism and negative values 
political liberalism. Thus, the mean and median values for AllyIdeology in our sample 
suggest that the congresspersons receiving the most contributions from our sample firms 
during the 2001–2002 congressional cycle tend to be, on average, more conservative than 
liberal. 
4.2. Multivariate analyses  
Table 4A reports results from the first-stage regression, i.e., the regression 
summarized in equation (1). Here, our three proxies for changes in corporate political 
spending – Δ PAC, Δ Lobbying, and Δ Tax Reports – serve alternatively as the 25 
 
dependent variable. The instrumental variable AllyIdeology has a negative and significant 
coefficient in all three regressions specifications in Table 4A. The results are consistent 
with our expectation that firms historically connected to more conservative politicians in 
the Congress give less in the period they lobby for lower taxes on repatriated foreign 
income. We expect this result because conservative politicians are ideologically more 
predisposed to lower taxes.  
We also perform a weak-instrument test to check the suitability of our 
instrumentation approach in Table 4A. Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) recommend the 
value of the F-statistic from the test be above 8.94 for a single instrument to be 
considered valid. The F-statistics in the three regressions of Table 4A are 10.21, 2.79, and 
13.06, respectively; the F-statistics suggest that all but the change in lobbying 
expenditures pass the Stock et al. test.  
The results of the second-stage regression are reported in Table 4B. The 
regression specification is described in equation (2). Since the regression is a Tobit 
model, parameter estimates cannot be directly interpreted for substantive significance. 
Accordingly, in lieu of parameter estimates, we report marginal effects; the p-values 
reported below the marginal effects refer to the statistical significance of the underlying 
parameter estimates.  
The coefficient on the variable  , which captures the return on 
political spending, is positive and statistically significant (at the 90% confidence level) in 
all three specifications of Table 4B. The result indicates that repatriations under the Act 
are associated with higher levels of political spending in the period leading up to the Act, 26 
 
after instrumenting for such spending. In the following section, we interpret the 
substantive significance of this result.  
The control variables in the regressions in Table 4 are the set of economic 
determinants of repatriation identified in Blouin and Krull (2009). Blouin and Krull argue 
firms that repatriate are more likely to have declining growth opportunities, decreasing 
research and development (R&D) and capital expenditures, and a higher level of free 
cash flows in the years prior to the passage of the Act. Following Blouin and Krull, we 
include ΔROA and ΔFPTI to control for financial performance, ΔMB for growth 
opportunities, ΔRD and ΔCapEx for change in R&D and capital expenditures, and FCF 
for free cash flows levels. They also conjecture firms with a high U.S. domestic tax 
burden, proxied for by USTR and RateDum, are more likely to receive more benefits by 
repatriating under the Act.  
In estimating the determinants of repatriation (second stage), we find the 
coefficients on ΔROA, ΔMB, ΔCapEx, and ΔFPTI are not statistically significant. 
However, the coefficient on ΔRD is negative and statistically significant and that on FCF 
is positive and statistically significant across all model specifications, as predicted by 
Blouin and Krull. The results suggest that firms with decreased R&D spending and 
increased free cash flows are more likely to repatriate under the Act. We also find that the 
variables USTR and RateDum are significantly and positively associated with 
repatriations, suggesting firms with a high U.S. tax burden are more likely to repatriate. 
These results are also consistent with those in the Blouin and Krull study.  
Tables 5A and 5B report the regression results using the levels of our three 
proxies for corporate political spending in lieu changes. Here, as with the changes, we 27 
 
use the cube-root transformation of the values to adjust for their non-normal distribution. 
Using the levels of political spending can be more meaningful in computing political 
returns since the levels represent the total political investment in a given period. The 
results are similar to those using changes. Table 5A reports results of the first-stage 
regressions. The instrumental variable AllyIdeology has a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient in all three of these regressions. This result is consistent with our 
expectation that firms historically contributing to conservative members of Congress give 
less in the period in which they lobby for lower taxes. The F-statistics in the three 
regressions of Table 5A are 39.19, 39.59, and 52.23, respectively, suggesting all 
specifications pass the Stock et al. weak-instrument test.  
The coefficient on the variable  , which attempts to capture the 
return on political spending, is positive and statistically significant in all three 
specifications of Table 5B, the second-stage regression. The results indicate that 
repatriations under the Act are associated with higher levels of political spending in the 
period leading up to the Act, after instrumenting for such spending. Apropos the control 
variables in the second stage, the coefficient on ΔRD is negative and statistically 
significant while the coefficients on FCF, USTR, and RateDum are positive and 
statistically significant across all model specifications. These results are consistent with 
Table 4B and the predictions in the Blouin and Krull study. As in Table 4B, we find 
insignificant coefficients on ΔROA, ΔMB, ΔCapEx, and ΔFPTI. 
4.3. Computing the return on political investment 
To compute the return on political investment from Table 4B, we examine the 
marginal effect of  across the table’s three panels, where political 28 
 
spending is variously represented by changes in PAC contributions, in lobbying 
expenditures, and in the number of tax-related lobbying reports filed in the 2003–2004 
congressional cycle. The marginal effects in Table 4B can be interpreted as the amount of 
repatriation per dollar of assets associated with the cube root of the change in political 
spending. Thus, to compute the effect of an increase of $100,000 in PAC contributions on 
repatriation, we multiply $100,000
(1/3) by the coefficient on political spending, i.e., 
0.000827, which yields an association of about 3.839% of assets. For the median firm in 
the regression with $5.094 billion in assets, this translates into about $195.54 million 
repatriated.  
Under the provisions of the Act, 85% of that amount is exempt from taxation. The 
taxes owed on the remaining 15% are approximately the difference between the U.S. tax 
rate (a maximum of 35% during the repatriation period) and the firm’s average foreign 
tax rate (foreign taxes paid are a credit in computing U.S. tax liability). For the median 
firm in the sample, the average foreign tax rate is about 25.59%. Assuming the median 
firm is at the 35% U.S. tax bracket, the $195.54 million repatriated in association with 
$100,000 of increased PAC spending results in a tax liability under the Act of about 
$2.76 million and thus, about $15.64 million in taxes saved. To see this, note that under 
the Act, taxes owed on the $195.54 million are = $195.54 million * 15% * (35% – 
25.59%) = $2.76 million. Without the Act, taxes owed on $195.54 million would be = 
$195.54 million * (35% – 25.59%) = $18.4 million. Thus, tax savings under the Act are = 
$18.4 million – $2.76 million = $15.64 million. 
As noted earlier, in computing political returns it can be more informative to use 
the levels of political spending because levels represent the total political investment in a 29 
 
given period. The marginal effects in Table 5B, which represent the amount of 
repatriation per dollar of assets associated with the cube root of the level in political 
spending, can be used to generate such return estimates. To compute the effect of 
$100,000 level of PAC contributions on repatriation, we multiply $100,000
(1/3) by the 
coefficient on lobbying spending from Table 5B, i.e., 0.000451, which yields an 
association of about 2.094% of assets. For the median firm in the regression with $5.094 
billion in assets, this translates into about $106.65 million repatriated. Using a calculation 
similar to that in the preceding paragraph, we can estimate that the $106.65 million 
repatriated in association with $100,000 million of PAC spending results in a tax liability 
under the Act of about $1.5 million and thus, about $8.53 million in taxes saved. 
Table 6 provides estimates of taxes saved on repatriations that are associated with 
changes in and levels of political spending, as predicted by the coefficients on 
 in Tables 4B and 5B. There are three columns in Table 6, 
corresponding to estimates of tax savings associated with $100,000 in PAC contributions, 
$1 million in lobbying expenditures, and the filing of ten tax-related lobbying reports.
8 In 
Panel A of Table 6, we use the coefficients from the regressions using changes in 
political spending (Table 4B). In Panel B of Table 6, we use the coefficients from the 
regressions using levels in political spending (Table 5B). In both panels, we assume the 
average foreign tax rate is at the sample median, i.e., 25.59%. From Panel A we learn that 
for the median firm in sample with $5.09 billion in assets, $1 million increase in lobbying 
expenditures (over the firm’s prior cycle spending) results in about $32.35 million in 
                                                 
8 We choose $100,000 as the illustrative for computing returns to PAC contributions, since PAC 
contributions are limited in magnitude by law.  30 
 
taxes saved. And, from Panel B we learn that for the median firm in sample with $5.09 
billion in assets, $1 million level of lobbying expenditures results in about $7.21 million 
in taxes saved.  
A similar calculation for changes in the number of tax-related lobbying reports 
(Panel A) suggests that the filing of ten additional reports is associated with about $21.08 
million in taxes saved; while the calculation for levels in tax-related lobbying reports 
(Panel B) suggests that ten such reports are associated with about $9.89 million in taxes 
saved. Table 6 also provides estimates for the returns to changes and levels in political 
spending for the 25
th and 75
th percentile size firms in the sample, with $1.817 billion 
$17.038 billion in assets, respectively.  
In un-tabulated calculations, we assume the average foreign tax rate is at the 25
th 
percentile of the sample, i.e., 11.38%. With a lower foreign tax rate, firms can expect to 
pay more in U.S. taxes; thus, repatriation under the Act becomes more valuable. For the 
median size firm in sample with $5.094 billion in assets, $1 million ($100,000) level of 
lobbying expenditures (PAC contributions) results in about $18.10 ($21.41) million in 
taxes saved. A similar calculation for the number of tax-related lobbying reports suggests 
that the filing of ten tax reports is associated with about $24.82 million in taxes saved.
9  
4.4. Sensitivity tests  
In additional tests, we repeat the regressions in Tables 4B and 5B using the 
observed values of the changes in and levels of corporate political spending in lieu of 
                                                 
9 We do not provide estimates of taxes saved on repatriations when the firm is at the 75
th percentile of 
average foreign tax rate. The reason is that average foreign tax rate at the 75
th percentile of the sample is 
over 38%, which exceeds the maximum U.S. tax rate in that period. Thus, sample firms in the 75
th 
percentile of average foreign tax rate do not receive any benefit from repatriating under the Act. 31 
 
. In other words, we repeat the regressions without addressing the 
potential omitted-variable bias induced by our reliance on the Blouin and Krull model of 
economic determinants of repatriation. The coefficients on the proxies for corporate 
political spending in these regressions remain positive and statistically significant; 
however, they are about twice in magnitude of those reported in Tables 4B and 5B. For 
example, for the median size firm in sample with $5.094 billion in assets and assuming 
the average foreign tax rate is at the sample median, i.e., 25.59%, $1 million ($100,000) 
level of lobbying expenditures (PAC contribution) results in about $21.6 ($25.6) million 
in taxes saved. A similar calculation for the number of tax-related lobbying reports 
suggests that the filing of ten such reports is associated with about $29.67 million in taxes 
saved.  
These higher return estimates suggest that not instrumenting for corporate 
political spending can result in overstating the return on corporate political contributions. 
This finding is particularly significant given the wide coverage received by the Alexander 
et al. (2009) study. That study does not address the key methodological concerns 
associated with estimating returns to political spending. 
5. Conclusion 
  We examine the returns to corporate political spending on what became the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. Our setting and research methods partly overcome 
two challenges prior literature encounters when estimating political returns: quantifying 
the benefit from a given legislation or regulation; and isolating the investment in political 
spending to achieve that benefit (since firms can engage in political spending for many 
reasons). We find that repatriation under the Act is an increasing function of prior 32 
 
political spending, after instrumenting for that spending. The instrument for political 
spending in our model is the ideology of the congressperson historically receiving the 
most contributions from the firm in question. We use the historical level of contributions 
between firm and congressperson to proxy for the relationship between the two (e.g., 
Snyder, 1992), so the congressperson with the most contributions is assumed to have a 
strong relationship with the firm. That congressperson’s ideology is used to instrument 
for the firm’s tax-related political spending: the expectation being the more conservative 
the firm’s allies in Congress, the less the tax-related political spending (since 
conservative congresspersons are more likely to support lower taxes).  
Our tests allow us to estimate the economic return to corporate political spending 
on the repatriation-tax holiday in the Act. Specifically, we find for the median politically 
active firm in our sample that an increase in $1 million in lobbying expenditures is 
associated with about $32.35 million in taxes saved, an increase in $100,000 of PAC 
contributions is associated with about $15.64 million in taxes saved, and that the 
additional filing of ten tax-related lobbying reports is associated with about $21.08 
million in taxes saved. Our estimates differ sharply from those generated in prior 
academic analyses (Alexander et al., 2009) and subsequently circulated in the press (e.g., 
Eggen, 2009; Newman, 2011). In particular, Alexander et al. suggest that firms lobbying 
for the American Jobs Creation Act “have a return in excess of $220 for every $1 spent 
on lobbying.”  
Our results are relevant in light of recent attempts to generate support in the 
Congress for another “one-time” tax break on repatriated foreign income (e.g., Worstall, 
2013; Stephenson and Temple-West, 2014). Moreover, our setting allows us to offer 33 
 
relatively precise estimates of returns to lobbying. Although the link between corporate 
tax-related benefits and special-interest lobbying has been widely theorized (e.g., Stigler, 
1971; Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman, 1997; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010), there is little 
formal evidence on the causal relation between the two. Our estimates, generated through 
the use of a novel instrumental variable, offer some indication of the magnitudes of 
corporate political returns in the United States.  
A final few notes on interpreting our results: First, we focus on political 
investments for a repatriation-tax holiday during a single congressional cycle and do not 
consider political investments on this issue that firms may have made in prior cycles. To 
the extent that these prior investments also contributed to the repatriation-tax holiday’s 
passage in 2004, our return estimates could be biased upwards. Therefore, our returns 
should be interpreted as the upper-bound estimates of the “true” return value. Second, the 
relation between political spending and lower taxation does not necessarily imply that 
politicians involved in the process were bribed. The alternative hypothesis to explain the 
role of money in politics is that politicians are “busy” individuals with numerous 
competing interests on their time. Political spending plays a crucial role in that it enables 
special-interest groups to attract politicians to their causes, since money represents a 
credible signal of the importance of a cause. In the context of this hypothesis, the role of 
political spending in the American Jobs Creation Act can be viewed as efficiency 
enhancing.  34 
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Appendix B 
Summary of tax bills receiving House floor action in the 108
th Congress 
 
Panel A: Breakdown by last-achieved stage in the legislative process 
 
Last major action  Number of bills 
Floor action in the House  41 
Passed by the House                   41 
Floor action in the Senate  21 
Passed by the Senate                  20 
Cleared for the White House                       16 
Signed into Law                       16 
 
Panel B: Breakdown by bills’ major focus 
 
Major focus of the bill  Number of bills 
Personal taxes  20 
Corporate income tax (the AJCA)                   1 
Tax code reform/simplification  4 
Tariff/duty 2 
Pension/retirement plan  3 
Energy                  1 
Transportation 5 
Healthcare/Medicare                       2 
Others* 3 
Total 41 
* These three tax bills concern issues related to the YMCA retirement fund, archery products importation, 





Summary statistics for changes and levels in political spending 
 
     
Sample firms: 
politically active U.S. 
firms with overseas 
operations 
  
Politically active U.S. 
firms without overseas 
operations 
     
 
n = 513    n= 367    
  
 
Mean Median    Mean Median      
Δ PAC 
 
$21,401 $4,000    $13,993 $500    
Δ Lobbying 
 
$292,753 $0    $72,899 $0    ** 
Δ Tax Reports 
 
0.66 0.00    0.15 0.00    ** 
PAC contributions 
 
$118,569 $38,999   $62,592 $15,000    *** 
Lobbying expenditures  $1,360,077  $0    $323,171 $0    *** 
Tax-related lobbying reports 
  
2.97  0.00     1.05  0.00     *** 
 
The sample of 513 firms is the primary sample – politically active U.S. firms with overseas operations 
during our period of interest (that is, at least since 1998 and at least through 2006). The sample of 367 firms 
includes politically active U.S. firms without overseas operations during our period of interest. Δ PAC is 
the change in PAC contributions from the 108
th to the 107
th Congress. Δ Lobbying is the change in 
lobbying expenditures from the 108
th to the 107
th Congress. Δ Tax Reports is the change in the number of 
tax-related lobbying reports from the 108
th to the 107
th Congress. The levels of political spending, reported 
in the last three rows, are for the 108
th Congress. The notations ** and *** signify that the difference in 




Pearson correlations between proxies for changes and levels in political spending 
 






Δ Lobbying  0.21***      
Δ Tax Reports  0.08*  0.23***     
PAC contributions  0.39***  0.30***  0.19***    
Lobbying  expenditures  0.21*** 0.55*** 0.23*** 0.61***  
Tax-related  lobbying  reports  0.14*** 0.33*** 0.47*** 0.62*** 0.70*** 
 
The sample is politically active U.S. firms with overseas operations during our period of interest (that is, at least 
since 1998 and at least through 2006). Δ PAC is the change in PAC contributions from the 108
th to the 107
th 
Congress. Δ Lobbying is the change in lobbying expenditures from the 108
th to the 107
th Congress. Δ Tax Reports is 
the change in the number of tax-related lobbying reports from the 108
th to the 107
th Congress. The levels of political 
spending – denoted PAC contributions, Lobbying expenditures, and Tax-related lobbying reports – are for the 108
th 
Congress. All political spending variables are subject to a cube-root transformation and are winsorized at 1% and 




Summary statistics for variables other than those measuring political spending 
 
Variable     Mean     Median 
Repatriation    0.021    0.000 
AllyIdeology    0.150    0.236 
ROA

-0.006    0.000 
MB

-0.358    0.005 
RD

0.000    0.000 
CapEx

-0.005    -0.002 
FCF    0.091    0.082 
USTR    0.070    0.000 
FPTI

0.001    0.000 
RateDum    0.881    1.000 
%FAssets    0.193     0.079 
 
The sample is politically active U.S. firms with overseas operations during our period of interest (that is, at least 
since 1998 and at least through 2006). Repatriation is the dollar amount of repatriation under the Act, scaled by firm 
assets. AllyIdeology is our instrument – it is the value of congressional ideology (first dimension of the Common 
Space Score) for the congressperson receiving the most contributions from the firm in question during the 107
th 
Congress (see Section 3 for more details). ΔROA is the change in net income scaled by worldwide assets for the 
period 2001 to 2004. ΔMB is the change in the firm’s market value to book value ratio for the period 2001 to 2004. 
ΔRD is the change in the ratio of research and development expenses to worldwide assets for the period 2001 to 
2004. ΔCapEx is the change in capital expenditures divided by worldwide assets for the period 2001 to 2004. FCF is 
the average operating cash flows divided by worldwide assets for the period 2001 to 2004. USTR is the average U.S. 
tax rate from 2001 through 2004. ΔFPTI is the change in foreign pre-tax income scaled by worldwide assets. 
RateDum is a dummy variable set to one if the U.S. tax rate of 35% exceeds the average foreign tax rate from 2001 
to 2004, zero otherwise. %FAssets is the ratio of foreign assets (estimated as described in Oler et al., 2007) to 
worldwide assets. All continuous variables have been winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. 42 
 
Table 4A 
First stage of the 2SLS regression: OLS using changes in political spending 







Δ Tax Reports 
Constant 10.14  10.90  0.10 
 (0.03)  (0.22)  (0.49) 
AllyIdeology  -12.39 -12.90  -0.43 
   (0.00)  (0.07)  (0.00) 
ROA -0.602 -0.728 -0.011 
   (0.80)  (0.88)  (0.88) 
MB 0.021 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.67)  (0.98)  (0.92) 
RD -191.27 -417.83  -8.56 
  (0.35)    (0.30)    (0.17) 
CapEx 79.39 -100.60 -3.93 
 (0.38)  (0.56)  (0.15) 
FCF  22.87 9.06  1.22 
   (0.17)  (0.78)  (0.02) 
USTR  12.13 41.84  0.32 
   (0.28)  (0.05)  (0.34) 
FPTI 233.44 293.48  3.82 
(0.30)  (0.50)  (0.58) 
RateDum  -3.76 -5.98 -0.12 
(0.37)  (0.46)  (0.35) 
%FAssets  -8.63 -3.30 0.21 
 (0.11)  (0.75)  (0.21) 
Weak Instrument Test (F-test)    10.21    2.79    13.06 
Adjusted R
2    0.020    0.003    0.038 
Number of observations     511     511     511 
 
The sample is politically active U.S. firms with overseas operations during our period of interest (that is, at least 
since 1998 and at least through 2006). Δ PAC is the change in PAC contributions from the 108
th to the 107
th 
Congress. Δ Lobbying is the change in lobbying expenditures from the 108
th to the 107
th Congress. Δ Tax Reports is 
the change in the number of tax-related lobbying reports from the 108
th to the 107
th Congress. All political spending 
variables are subject to a cube-root transformation. AllyIdeology is our instrument – it is the value of congressional 
ideology (first dimension of the Common Space Score) for the congressperson receiving the most contributions from 
the firm in question during the 107
th Congress (see Section 3 for more details). ΔROA is the change in net income 
scaled by worldwide assets for the period 2001 to 2004. ΔMB is the change in the firm’s market value to book value 
ratio for the period 2001 to 2004. ΔRD is the change in the ratio of research and development expenses to worldwide 
assets for the period 2001 to 2004. ΔCapEx is the change in capital expenditures divided by worldwide assets for the 
period 2001 to 2004. FCF is the average operating cash flows divided by worldwide assets for the period 2001 to 
2004. USTR is the average U.S. tax rate from 2001 through 2004. ΔFPTI is the change in foreign pre-tax income 
scaled by worldwide assets. RateDum is a dummy variable set to one if the U.S. tax rate of 35% exceeds the average 43 
 
foreign tax rate from 2001 to 2004, zero otherwise. %FAssets is the ratio of foreign assets (estimated as described in 
Oler et al., 2007) to worldwide assets. All continuous variables have been winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of 




Second stage of the 2SLS regression: Tobit of Repatriation on predicted values of changes 





   Repatriation 
     Δ PAC     Δ Lobbying     Δ Tax Reports 
Constant -0.33  -0.33  -0.33 
  (<.0001)   (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
  + 0.000827  0.000794  0.024014 
    (0.08)   (0.08)  (0.08) 
ROA - 0.0022 0.0023  0.0020 
    (0.83)   (0.83)  (0.83) 
MB - -0.0004 -0.0003  -0.0004 
  (0.22)   (0.24)  (0.23) 
RD - -0.7760 -0.6024  -0.7288 
  (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00) 
CapEx - -0.2433 -0.0977  -0.0833 
  (0.33)   (0.43)  (0.42) 
FCF  + 0.0807  0.0924  0.0704 
    (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00) 
USTR  + 0.0671  0.0439  0.0693 
    (<.0001)   (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
FPTI - -0.3485 -0.3885  -0.2472 
(0.40)   (0.41)  (0.54) 
RateDum  + 0.0165  0.0181  0.0163 
(0.01)   (0.01)  (0.01) 
%FAssets  + 0.0631  0.0586  0.0510 
(<.0001)   (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Sigma 0.1400  0.1400  0.1400 
(<.0001)   (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Log-likelihood 
   -36.90    -36.90    -36.90 
Number of observations     511     511     511 
 
The sample is politically active U.S. firms with overseas operations during our period of interest (that is, at least 
since 1998 and at least through 2006). Repatriation is the dollar amount of repatriation under the Act, scaled by firm 
assets. Δ PAC is the change in PAC contributions from the 108
th to the 107
th Congress. Δ Lobbying is the change in 
lobbying expenditures from the 108
th to the 107
th Congress. Δ Tax Reports is the change in the number of tax-related 44 
 
lobbying reports from the 108
th to the 107
th Congress. All political spending variables are subject to a cube-root 
transformation. ΔROA is the change in net income scaled by worldwide assets for the period 2001 to 2004. ΔMB is 
the change in the firm’s market value to book value ratio for the period 2001 to 2004. ΔRD is the change in the ratio 
of research and development expenses to worldwide assets for the period 2001 to 2004. ΔCapEx is the change in 
capital expenditures divided by worldwide assets for the period 2001 to 2004. FCF is the average operating cash 
flows divided by worldwide assets for the period 2001 to 2004. USTR is the average U.S. tax rate from 2001 through 
2004. ΔFPTI is the change in foreign pre-tax income scaled by worldwide assets. RateDum is a dummy variable set 
to one if the U.S. tax rate of 35% exceeds the average foreign tax rate from 2001 to 2004, zero otherwise. %FAssets 
is the ratio of foreign assets (estimated as described in Oler et al., 2007) to worldwide assets. All continuous 
variables have been winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. Except for the Constant and Sigma, the 
marginal effect of each variable on Repatriation is presented. Figures in parentheses are two-tailed p-values.45 
 
Table 5A 
First stage of the 2SLS regression: OLS using levels of political spending 




contributions    
Lobbying 




Constant 33.82  51.88  0.74 
 (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
AllyIdeology  -22.72 -57.75  -0.91 
   (<.0001)  (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
ROA 0.010 -0.276 0.000 
   (1.00)  (0.96)  (1.00) 
MB 0.029 -0.015 0.000 
 (0.53)  (0.90)  (0.81) 
RD 1.89 -47.23 -2.52 
  (0.99)    (0.92)    (0.71) 
CapEx -41.20 -272.31  -3.93 
 (0.63)  (0.21)  (0.19) 
FCF  11.81 -0.75  0.16 
   (0.46)  (0.99)  (0.77) 
USTR  -7.08 32.83 0.55 
   (0.50)  (0.23)  (0.14) 
FPTI 225.50 543.95  2.60 
(0.29)  (0.32)  (0.73) 
RateDum  -5.21 -17.14 -0.26 
(0.19)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
%FAssets  -17.38 -11.74  0.06 
 (0.00)  (0.37)  (0.73) 
Weak Instrument Test (F-test)    39.19    39.59    52.23 
Adjusted R
2    0.079    0.072    0.097 
Number of observations     511     511     511 
 
The sample is politically active U.S. firms with overseas operations during our period of interest (that is, at least 
since 1998 and at least through 2006). The levels of political spending – denoted PAC contributions, Lobbying 
expenditures, and Tax-related lobbying reports – are for the 108
th Congress. All political spending variables are 
subject to a cube-root transformation. AllyIdeology is our instrument – it is the value of congressional ideology (first 
dimension of the Common Space Score) for the congressperson receiving the most contributions from the firm in 
question during the 107
th Congress (see Section 3 for more details). ΔROA is the change in net income scaled by 
worldwide assets for the period 2001 to 2004. ΔMB is the change in the firm’s market value to book value ratio for 
the period 2001 to 2004. ΔRD is the change in the ratio of research and development expenses to worldwide assets 
for the period 2001 to 2004. ΔCapEx is the change in capital expenditures divided by worldwide assets for the 
period 2001 to 2004. FCF is the average operating cash flows divided by worldwide assets for the period 2001 to 
2004. USTR is the average U.S. tax rate from 2001 through 2004. ΔFPTI is the change in foreign pre-tax income 
scaled by worldwide assets. RateDum is a dummy variable set to one if the U.S. tax rate of 35% exceeds the average 
foreign tax rate from 2001 to 2004, zero otherwise. %FAssets is the ratio of foreign assets (estimated as described in 46 
 
Oler et al., 2007) to worldwide assets. All continuous variables have been winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of 










   Repatriation 
    
PAC 
contributions    
Lobbying 
expenditures    
Tax-related 
lobbying reports 
Constant -0.36  -0.33  -0.33 
  (<.0001)   (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
  + 0.000451  0.000177  0.011266 
    (0.08)   (0.08)  (0.08) 
ROA - 0.0017 0.0018  0.0018 
    (0.83)   (0.83)  (0.83) 
MB - -0.0004 -0.0003  -0.0004 
  (0.22)   (0.24)  (0.23) 
RD - -0.9356 -0.9258  -0.9006 
  (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00) 
CapEx - -0.1592 -0.1293  -0.1333 
  (0.33)   (0.43)  (0.42) 
FCF  + 0.0943  0.0997  0.0978 
    (0.00)   (0.00)  (0.00) 
USTR  + 0.0803  0.0713  0.0709 
    (<.0001)   (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
FPTI - -0.2573 -0.2519  -0.1847 
(0.40)   (0.41)  (0.54) 
RateDum  + 0.0157  0.0166  0.0162 
(0.01)   (0.01)  (0.01) 
%FAssets  + 0.0638  0.0581  0.0553 
(<.0001)   (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Sigma 0.1400  0.1400  0.1400 
(<.0001)   (<.0001)  (<.0001) 
Log-likelihood 
   -36.90    -36.90    -36.90 
Number of observations     511     511     511 
 
The sample is politically active U.S. firms with overseas operations during our period of interest (that is, at least 
since 1998 and at least through 2006). Repatriation is the dollar amount of repatriation under the Act, scaled by firm 
assets. The levels of political spending – denoted PAC contributions, Lobbying expenditures, and Tax-related 
lobbying reports – are for the 108
th Congress. All political spending variables are subject to a cube-root 
transformation. ΔROA is the change in net income scaled by worldwide assets for the period 2001 to 2004. ΔMB is 47 
 
the change in the firm’s market value to book value ratio for the period 2001 to 2004. ΔRD is the change in the ratio 
of research and development expenses to worldwide assets for the period 2001 to 2004. ΔCapEx is the change in 
capital expenditures divided by worldwide assets for the period 2001 to 2004. FCF is the average operating cash 
flows divided by worldwide assets for the period 2001 to 2004. USTR is the average U.S. tax rate from 2001 through 
2004. ΔFPTI is the change in foreign pre-tax income scaled by worldwide assets. RateDum is a dummy variable set 
to one if the U.S. tax rate of 35% exceeds the average foreign tax rate from 2001 to 2004, zero otherwise. %FAssets 
is the ratio of foreign assets (estimated as described in Oler et al., 2007) to worldwide assets. All continuous 
variables have been winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. Except for the Constant and Sigma, the 




Return on political investment 
 
Panel A: Using coefficients from regressions on changes in political spending 
 
Firm asset size     Δ PAC = 
$100,000     Δ Lobbying = 
$1,000,000     Δ Tax Reports  
= 10 
25th percentile, $1.817 billion    $5,578,734    $11,539,420    $7,519,021 
50th percentile, $5.094 billion    $15,640,105    $32,351,021    $21,079,744 
75th percentile, $17.038 billion     $52,311,761     $108,205,084     $70,505,826 
 
Panel B: Using coefficients from regressions on levels of political spending 
 











reports  = 10 
25th percentile, $1.817 billion    $3,042,751    $2,572,390    $3,527,465 
50th percentile, $5.094 billion    $8,530,420    $7,211,752    $9,889,326 
75th percentile, $17.038 billion     $28,531,859     $24,121,284     $33,077,021 
 
The sample is politically active U.S. firms with overseas operations during our period of interest (that is, at least 
since 1998 and at least through 2006). Δ PAC is the change in PAC contributions from the 108
th to the 107
th 
Congress. Δ Lobbying is the change in lobbying expenditures from the 108
th to the 107
th Congress. Δ Tax Reports is 
the change in the number of tax-related lobbying reports from the 108
th to the 107
th Congress. The levels of political 
spending – denoted PAC contributions, Lobbying expenditures, and Tax-related lobbying reports – are for the 108
th 
Congress. Calculations in the table assume that the average foreign tax rate is at the sample median, which is 
25.59%.  
 